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		Introduction	
	
The	 two	 key	 financial	 decisions	 that	 nearly	 all	 households	 have	 to	 make	 are	
related	to	a	place	to	live	(especially	if	this	involves	a	mortgage),	and	the	savings	
needed	to	have	an	acceptable	income	during	retirement:	pension	savings.	
	
In	 a	 previous	 paper:	 “After	 the	 Great	 Recession:	 the	 Laws	 of	 Unintended	
Consequences”1	the	writer	 sets	 outs	 the	 impact	 on	 U.S.	 mortgage	 holders	 as	 a	
result	 of	 the	 U.S.	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2007-2008.	 This	 paper	 will	 explore	 the	
situation	in	the	Eurozone	countries	(which	share	one	base	rate	for	the	Euro,	but	
have	 fundamentally	different	 inflation	rates	and	government	bond	yields)	after	
first	examining	the	links	between	the	U.S.	financial	crisis	and	the	pensions	crisis	
in	Europe.	
	
Pension	 savings,	 by	 their	 very	 nature,	 represent	 postponed	 expenditure.	 This	
raises	a	number	of	issues:	what	are	the	returns	going	to	be?	Should	such	savings	
be	made	 in	collective	vehicles	 -	 like	pension	 funds,	either	company	or	 industry	
wide	ones	-	or	in	individual	accounts?	
	
Setting	 aside	 savings	 for	 future	 pension	 payments	 automatically	 affects	 an	
individual’s	 current	 spending	 levels.	 The	 reward	 for	 postponing	 current	
spending	 depends	 mainly	 on	 Central	 Banks’	 and	 Governments’	 economic	
policies.	As	will	be	explained	in	this	paper,	the	main	problem	is	that	government	
bond	yields	no	longer	compensate	for	inflation	levels	in	some	countries.		
	
Pension	savings	are	very	much	a	national	issue,	rather	than	a	Eurozone	area	one.	
Therefore	national	 solutions	need	 to	be	 found,	 rather	 than	pan-Eurozone	ones.	
One	 option	 that	 will	 be	 explored	 is	 to	 compensate	 pension	 savers	 on	 their	
government	 bond	 holdings	 to	 a	 level	 equivalent	 of	 CPI	 levels	 plus	 0.25%.	 The	
economic	implications	of	this	for	both	a	central	bank	and	a	government	will	be	
set	out	in	this	paper.	The	Netherlands	–as	the	country	that	in	the	Eurozone	has	
the	 highest	 accumulated	 collective	 pension	 savings	 compared	 to	 its	 GDP-	 has	
been	selected	to	show	how	this	may	work.	
	
As	 the	 current	 levels	 of	 interest	 rates	 are	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 2007-2008	
financial	 crisis	 that	 started	 in	 the	U.S.,	 attention	will	 first	 be	paid	 to	what	was,	
and	what	was	not,	done	to	solve	that	crisis.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																								
1	https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/92839/1/MPRA_paper_92839.pdf	
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1.	The	concept	of	savings  
 
Any	 income	 not	 spent	 on	 consumption	 in	 a	 particular	 year	 is	 defined	 as	
“savings”.			
	
It	is	clear	that	savings	made	towards	a	future	pension	income	implies	postponing	
consumption	 in	the	current	period.	What	 is	often	misunderstood	 is	 that	paying	
back	a	home	mortgage	has	a	 similar	effect	 for	a	household	 living	 in	an	owner-
occupied	 property.	 By	 paying	 an	 amount	 on	 the	 mortgage	 each	 month,	 the	
owner-occupier	is	building	up	equity.	This	applies	both	for	the	principal	sum	and	
for	the	interest	charged.	Both	pension	savings	and	the	building	up	of	the	equity	
base	in	one’s	own	home	leads	(or	should	lead)	to	a	higher	disposable	income	in	
future,	as	opposed	to	where	no	such	payments	are	being	made.	Paying	rent,	on	
the	other	hand,	is	expenditure	out	of	current	income	that	has	no	future	benefit.	
Paying	 rent	 can	 therefore	be	 classified	as	 consumption,	whilst	paying	off	 one’s	
mortgage	can	be	classified	as	savings.	
	
Other	 borrowings	 such	 as	 car	 or	 credit	 card	 loans	 all	 increase	 current	 income	
and	 reduce	 future	 ones.	 Student	 loans	 are	 meant	 to	 help	 students	 to	 earn	 a	
higher	 income	 in	 later	 life	 (versus	 those	 without	 a	 university	 education).	
However,	it	is	an	intangible	asset,	and	one	that	fully	depends	on	the	type	of	jobs	
available	and	the	remuneration	for	such	jobs.	There	is,	by	definition,	no	physical	
asset	that	can	be	turned	into	cash	in	later	life	or	used	to	release	“equity”	when	a	
higher	level	of	income	would	be	welcomed.	
	
1.1	The	risks	to	savings	
	
If	 life	was	not	difficult	 enough,	 savings	 for	 the	 long	 term	are	 exposed	 to	many	
market	risks,	 including	the	risks	and	actions	(or	 inactions)	of	governments	and	
central	banks.	
	
The	after-effects	of	the	U.S.	financial	crisis	of	2007-2008	are	still	being	felt	in	the	
European	financial	markets.	This	has	led	to	the	current	threat	of	cuts	in	pension	
payouts	 in	 a	 number	 of	 European	 countries.	 The	 similarity	 between	 pension	
payouts	in	some	European	countries	with	the	U.S.	mortgage	payments	(personal	
savings	made	to	achieve	the	aim	of	owning	one’s	own	home	outright)	is	striking.	
	
Both	rely	on	personal	savings	 levels;	both	build	up	an	asset	base	that	creates	a	
future	 income	 (pension	 savings),	 or	 reduces	 future	 expenditure	 levels.	 This	
results	in	enjoying	a	better	income	later	in	life	as	a	consequence	of	having	paid	
off	 the	household’s	mortgage	obligations.	Both	economic	actions	are	 subject	 to	
the	vagaries	of	market	movements.	
	
The	historic	order	in	which	economic	developments	took	place	should	start	with	
the	U.S.	home	mortgage	crisis.		
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1.2	The	case	of	the	United	States		
	
The	U.S.	financial	crisis	of	2007-2008	created	a	recession:	the	Great	Recession.	A	
recession	is	technically	declared	over	after	two	subsequent	quarters	of	economic	
growth.	By	Q3	2009,	the	Great	Recession	was	declared	over.	However,	the	laws	
of	unintended	consequences	show	a	totally	different	picture.	Between	May	2007	
and	October	 2009	 nearly	 7	million	U.S.	 individuals	 lost	 their	 jobs	 and	 thereby	
their	 incomes2.3	It	 took	 just	 over	 ten	 years	 before	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 had	
dropped	 again	 to	 4.4%	 -	 back	 to	 what	 it	 was	 in	 December	 2006.	 Equally	
unintended	was	the	development	in	the	real	median	household	income.	In	2007	
this	 income	was	 $59,5344.	 It	 dropped	 to	 $54,569	 for	 2012	 and	 only	 returned	
back	 to	 the	 levels	 of	 2007	 by	 2016.	 Another	 unintended	 consequence	was	 the	
difference	 between	 the	 fix	 for	 the	 banks	 in	 trouble	 and	 those	 for	 individual	
mortgage	borrowers	 in	 trouble.	Nearly	all	banks	were	bailed	out	 in	2008,	with	
the	odd	one	declared	bankrupt.	For	individual	households/mortgage	borrowers	
there	was	no	respite	 in	being	pursued	for	outstanding	mortgage	debt.	Over	the	
period	 2007-2014,	 21.228	 million	 U.S.	 households	 were	 confronted	 with	
foreclosure	 proceedings.	 This	 number	 represented	 41.4%	 of	 all	 household	
mortgage	 holders	 in	 the	U.S.	House	 prices	 tumbled	 after	 2007.	 The	 S&P/Case-
Shiller	national	home	price	index	seasonally	adjusted	stood	at	184.52	in	January	
2007	 and	 for	 the	 first	 time	 only	 exceeded	 this	 level	 by	 November	 2018	 at	
184.875.	 New	 housing	 starts	 also	 dropped	 significantly.	 In	 January	 2006	 the	
number	 was	 2.273	million	 annualized	 new	 starts.	 The	 trend	 line	moved	 from	
annualized	 490,000	 new	 starts	 in	 January	 2009	 to	 1.230	 million	 by	 January	
20196.	 Another	 main	 unintended	 consequence	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 was	 the	
effect	on	U.S.	government	borrowings.	U.S.	Federal	debt	increased	by	$4.8	trillion	
between	Q4	2007	and	Q4	20107,	while	real	GDP	still	shrank.	 In	three	years	the	
Federal	 Government’s	 debt	 increased	 by	 more	 than	 50%	 and	 its	 growth	 in	
government	debt	did	not	stop	there.	Another	major	change	was	in	interest	rates.	
Fed	 fund	rates	had	not	been	so	 low	for	over	60	years,	until	 recently8.	All	 these	
factors	show	that	a	more	streamlined	approach	to	economic	thinking	is	needed.	
The	 interactions	 between	 the	 financial	 markets	 and	 the	 real	 economy	 can	 be	
better	handled.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																								
2	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS	
3	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE	
4	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEFAINUSA672N	
5	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSA672N/	
6	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HOUST	
7	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDEBTN	
8	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/fedfunds	
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1.3	The	case	for	putting	a	safety	net	under	households’	incomes		
	
The	effects	of	the	U.S.	financial	sector	activities	on	household	jobs	and	incomes,	
on	 government	 debt	 levels	 and	 on	 other	 real	 sector	 activities	 such	 as	 new	
housing	 starts	 may	 all	 be	 well	 recognised,	 but	 now,	 11	 years	 after	 the	 Great	
Recession,	they	can	be	fully	analysed.		
	
Firstly,	the	causes	of	the	financial	crisis	can	be	found	in	the	actions	at	the	time	of	
banks,	 finance	 companies	 and	 hedge	 funds.	 Home	 mortgage	 loans	 cannot	 be	
created	 by	 hedge	 funds,	 so	 the	 principal	 responsibility	 for	 excessive	mortgage	
lending	can	only	be	attributed	to	 the	U.S.	banking	and	 finance	sector,	 including	
foreign	 banks	 operating	 in	 the	 U.S.	 Secondly,	 U.S.	 based	 banks	 and	 finance	
companies	wanted	to	offload	mortgage	credit	risks	to	third	parties	in	order	to	be	
able	 to	 underwrite	more	mortgage	 loans.	 They	 did	 so	 in	 several	 ways.	 Hedge	
funds	bought	up	a	sizeable	share	of	these	loans.	Loan	obligations	were	split	and	
sliced	into	various	components	and	packaged	for	sale	to	the	ultimate	investors,	
supported	 by	 AA	 or	 AA+	 ratings	 from	 the	 U.S.	 credit	 rating	 agencies.	 Such	
Mortgage-Backed	 Securities	 (“MBS”)	 were	 bought	 by	 pension	 funds,	 asset	
managers	 and	 other	 interested	 parties	 around	 the	 world.	 American	 Insurance	
Group	 (AIG),	 among	 others,	 offered	 credit	 default	 swaps,	 which	 made	 such	
investments	a	low	risk.	Such	securities	could	be	traded	on	a	daily	basis,	either	on	
stock	 markets	 or	 through	 market	 makers.	 The	 conversion	 from	 long-term	
lending	to	daily	pricing	was	complete:	the	conversion	process.	Was	daily	pricing	
a	 necessary	 evil?	 It	 depended	 on	 what	 one	 bought	 and	 the	 quality	 of	 the	
underlying	product.	A	product	that	is	based	on	other	peoples’	savings	or	debts	is	
a	 totally	 different	 product	 than	 any	 consumer	 good	 for	 sale.	 Generally,	
households	do	not	postpone	consumption	if	there	is	any	chance	of	losing	money	
saved.	 This	 applies	 most	 of	 all	 to	 the	 lower	 income	 groups	 as	 they	 can	 least	
afford	 such	 losses.	 However,	 the	 lower	 income	 groups	 and	 nearly	 all	 of	 the	
younger	 generation	 households	 are	 the	 ones	 that	 cannot	 buy	 homes	 outright;	
they	have	to	make	use	of	other	peoples’	savings.	The	securitization	of	mortgage	
debt	was	widespread	in	the	U.S.	In	2007,	all	securitized	mortgage	debt	reached	
in	total	a	volume	of	$7.3	trillion.	By	Q4	2007,	the	level	of	households’	 liabilities	
on	home	mortgages	 reached	 the	 level	 of	 $10.6	 trillion.	 The	 securitization	 level	
represented	 nearly	 69%	 of	 all	 household	mortgages	 and	 of	which	 the	 level	 of	
subprime	mortgages	was	$1.3	trillion9.	
	
In	2008,	the	U.S.	government	and	the	Federal	Reserve	put	measures	in	place	to	
rescue	the	U.S.	economy.	An	excellent	day-by-day	overview	has	been	published		
by	“The	Balance”10.		
	
The	 U.S.	 government’s	 first	 main	 major	 step	 was	 to	 sign	 into	 law	 in	 October	
2008,	the	“Troubled	Asset	Relief	Program”:	TARP11.	This	Program	was	originally	
																																																								
9	https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/041515/what-role-did-securitization-play-us-subprime-
mortgage-crisis.asp	
10	https://www.thebalance.com/mortgage-crisis-overview-315684	
11	https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/Pages/default.aspx	
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authorised	for	an	amount	of	$700	billion.	Later	in	2010	it	was	reduced	to	$450	
billion.	 The	 Program	 was	 managed	 by	 the	 Treasury	 Department.	 It	 allocated	
$250	billion	to	purchase	preference	shares	in	8	U.S.	banks.	It	allocated	$82	billion	
to	 support	 the	 auto	 industry;	 $70	 billion	 to	 support	 AIG;	 $46	 billion	 to	 help	
Americans	 confronted	with	 foreclosure	 proceedings;	 and	 $27	 billion	 to	 restart	
credit	markets.	The	Federal	Reserve	also	took	action.	It	rapidly	lowered	the	Fed	
fund	 rates	 from	5.26%	 in	 July	 2007	 to	 0.16%	by	December	 2008.	 The	 longest	
period	of	ultra-low	 interest	rates	began	and	only	by	May	2017	did	 the	 interest	
rate	marginally	exceed	the	previous	lowest	rate,	dating	back	all	the	way	to	1955.	
The	Fed	also	 took	major	 steps	 in	buying	up	$3.7	 trillion	of	U.S.	Treasuries	and	
mortgage	backed	securities	over	the	period	2009-201212.	 	 	The	U.S	government	
spent	 $4.8	 trillion	more	 than	 it	 received	 in	 taxes	 over	 the	 period	Q4	 2007-Q4	
2013,	 while	 real	 GDP	 levels	 still	 dropped.	 The	 distinction	 between	 a	 market-
driven	 recession	 and	 a	 money-driven	 one	 was	 not	 used	 to	 help	 solve	 the	
problems	 caused	 by	 the	 subprime	 mortgage	 crisis.	 Market-driven	 recessions	
require	 macro	 solutions,	 such	 as	 lowering	 interest	 rates;	 even	 quantitative	
easing	exercises	would	fall	under	this	heading,	as	would	additional	government	
spending	 levels.	 U.S.	 banks	 were	 nearly	 all	 rescued,	 and	 interest	 rates	 were	
lowered	 to	 their	 lowest	 level	 for	 nearly	 60	 years.	 During	 2008-2013,	 U.S.	
government	 debts	 increased	 at	 their	 fastest	 levels	 since	war	 times.	Money	 -or	
savings	 driven	 recessions-	 are	 linked	with	 disposable	 household	 incomes.	 The	
2007-2008	 financial	 crisis	was	a	money-driven	crisis.	Economic	history	 is	now	
known	and	 it	 is	perhaps	a	good	 time	 to	discuss	what	might	have	been	done	 to	
avoid	this	Financial	Crisis.		
	
Subprime	 mortgages	 (as	 well	 as	 all	 other	 mortgages)	 were	 household-related	
debt.	The	mix	of	prime,	Alt	A	and	subprime	mortgages	into	MBS’s	increased	the	
risk	 levels	 over	 such	 MBS’s.	 Had	 each	 type	 of	 security	 only	 contained	 either	
Prime	 or	 Alt	 A	mortgages,	 it	would	 have	 been	 likely	 that	 losses	 on	 such	 loans	
would	 have	 been	 foreseeable	 by	 the	 buyers,	 and	 incorporated	 in	 the	 purchase	
price.	 Bankers	 devised	more	 “creative”	methods	 and	 incorporated	 all	 types	 of	
mortgages	 as	well	 as	 all	 types	 of	 stripping	 and	mixing	 of	 such	mortgages.	 Not	
only	that,	U.S.	credit	rating	agencies	often	awarded	these	products	with	an	AA	or	
AA+	rating.	
	
The	conclusion	out	of	all	of	the	above	is	that	the	U.S.	Government	allocated	$46	
billion	out	of	its	Tarp	program	to	help	households.	To	put	this	in	context:	if	the	
total	outstanding	home	mortgage	portfolio	of	$10.6	trillion	had	been	financed	at	
the	average	interest	mortgage	rate	of	6.4%,	as	it	was	in	2007,	then	the	mortgage	
interest	 payments	 alone	 would	 have	 taken	 up	 $678	 billion,	 let	 alone	 the	
repayment	obligation	 that	 amounted	 to	 approximately	$350	billion	per	 annum	
for	all	30-year	mortgages.	
	
																																																																																							
1.4	Why	and	how	to	put	a	safety	net	under	households’	income	levels?	
																																																																																							
Paying	back	a	mortgage	creates	an	equity	position	in	an	owner-occupied	home.	If	
a	 mortgage	 payment	 is	 missed,	 not	 just	 once	 but	 say	 for	 three	 consecutive	
																																																								
12	www.cnbc.com/2017/11/24/the-fed-launched-qe-nine-years-ago--these-four-charts-show-its-
impact.html	
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months,	the	lenders	have	the	right	to	claim	penalty	interest	rates	and	ultimately	
reclaim	 the	 ownership	 of	 the	 property.	 In	 2008	 and	 later	 years,	 many	 equity	
positions	built	up	in	homes	were	lost,	especially	for	buyers	who	bought	property	
in	the	few	years	before	2008.	
	
One	of	the	reasons	that	mortgage	payments	were	missed	in	2008	was	that	often	
very	 low	 start	 up	 interest	 rates	 were	 granted	 on	 a	 sizeable	 share	 of	 the	
mortgages	granted	in	2005,	2006	and	2007.	These	deals	came	to	an	end	in	2008	
and	 substantially	 increased	mortgage	payments	were	 then	enforced	on	a	 large	
number	of	 these	mortgagees.	Unfortunately,	house	prices	also	started	 falling	 in	
2007.	
	
In	this	paper,	speculators	who	bought	more	than	one	home	for	renting	purposes	
are	not	included	in	these	considerations.	
	
The	 effects	 of	 the	 credit	 squeeze	 on	 the	 economy	 and	 on	 many	 individual	
households	 were	 devastating.	 Between	 May	 2007	 and	 October	 2009,	 U.S.	
unemployment	 levels	 increased	 by	 7	 million	 individuals;	 many	 of	 the	 newly	
unemployed	were	heads	of	households.	Real	incomes	dropped	by	8.3%	between	
2007	and	2012	and	did	not	return	to	the	2007	level	until	2016.	House	building	
levels	dropped	by	78.5%	in	2009	as	compared	to	the	2006	level	and	still	in	2019	
this	 level	 currently	 runs	 at	 only	 46%	 of	 the	 2006	 level.	 Average	 home	 prices	
were	depressed	for	over	a	10-year	period	from	January	2007	to	October	2018.	
	
With	all	this	evidence	in	place,	a	key	thing	that	the	U.S.	government	failed	to	do	
was	to	link	income	levels	to	mortgage	expenses	for	owner-occupied	households.	
Income	 levels	 are	 variable	 and	 monthly	 mortgage	 payments	 could	 change	 to	
reflect	the	changes	up	or	down	in	income,	all	within	a	fixed	ratio.	
	
Why	 should	 a	 government	 do	 this?	 In	 the	 U.S.,	 it	 is	 recommended	 that	
households	 spend	 no	more	 than	 28%	 of	 their	 gross	 income	 on	 servicing	 their	
mortgage	 related	 debt	 (including	 home	 insurance	 and	 property	 taxes)	 and	 no	
more	than	36%	of	their	gross	income	on	all	debts	(including	consumer	loans	and	
credit	 card	 debts).13		 Any	 excess	 expenditure	 gets	 households	 into	 financial	
trouble.	 In	 2007	 and	 2008,	many	U.S.	 households	 had	 no	 other	 option	 than	 to	
exceed	the	28/36%	norm.	Low	start-up	teaser	mortgage	rates	were	coming	off	
and	 unemployment	 levels	 went	 up	 strongly.	 Real	 median	 household	 incomes	
dropped	substantially	and,	on	top	of	this,	house	prices	were	dropping	rapidly.	
	
With	dropping	real	incomes,	less	job	opportunities	and	falling	house	prices,	the	
apparent	only	possible	way	out	was	for	households	to	accept	all	these	losses.	For	
many,	it	meant	giving	up	on	the	American	dream	of	owning	one’s	own	property.	
Properties	were	handed	back	to	lenders,	who	sold	these	homes	at	a	discount	to	
dispose	 of	 them	 quickly.	 This	 led	 to	 further	 falling	 house	 prices	 and	 further	
trouble	for	many	American	households.	
	
																																																								
13	https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/12/reasonable-amount-of-debt.asp	
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At	this	point,	the	question	should	have	been	asked:	does	the	pursuit	of	profits	by	
the	 banking	 sector	 outweigh	 the	 importance	 of	 continued	 economic	 growth	
levels	in	the	country	as	a	whole?	Most	banking	profits	are	monetary	gains,	made	
from	 allocating	 savings	 from	 some	 households	 to	 others	 who	 are	 short	 of	
savings.	Banks	did	what	their	shareholders	expected	of	them	and	lent	the	funds,	
only	to	experience	that	collectively	they	lent	a	greater	amount	than	most	of	their	
home	mortgage	customers	could	support	out	of	their	income	levels.	From	early	
2008,	 the	 pursuit	 of	 profits	 by	 the	 banking	 sector	 became	 a	 loss-limitation	
exercise,	bringing	with	it	all	of	its	negative	consequences	on	house	prices	for	all	
homeowners,	whether	mortgagees	or	not.	The	same	loss-limitation	exercise	also	
put	excessive	pressure	on	many	household	incomes,	thereby	causing	demand	for	
other	 goods	 and	 services	 to	 drop	 at	 a	 remarkably	 fast	 pace.	 Government	 tax	
revenues	also	experienced	substantial	drops.	
	
A	money-driven	 recession	 can	be	 counteracted,	 but	 not	 by	 the	 banking	 sector.	
These	bank	loss	limitation	strategies	have	been	proven	to	be	counterproductive	
to	maintaining	economic	growth	levels.		
	
What	banks	cannot	do	is	provide	mortgages	on	a	basis	of	a	fixed	percentage	of	a	
customer’s	 income	as	 such	 income	 levels	may	well	 fluctuate	 for	a	 considerable	
length	 of	 time.	 However,	 this	 is	 exactly	 what	 was	 needed	 in	 2008	 and	 if	 U.S.	
economic	 forecasts	 are	 correct,	 such	 mechanism	 may	 soon	 be	 needed	 again.	
Something	needs	to	change!	
	
	
1.5	The	Scheme		
	
The	 writer	 proposes	 that	 a	 new	 scheme	 is	 needed	 to	 balance	 incomes	 with	
expenditure.	A	key	element	of	the	“Scheme”	is	to	recognize	that	the	U.S.	collective	
banking	sector	made	many	and	serious	credit	risk	mistakes	in	the	years	2004	to	
2008.	It	granted	mortgages	that	exceeded	the	ability	of	a	substantial	number	of	
borrowers	to	repay	such	borrowings.	Banks	started	a	loss-limitation	exercise	in	
2008	and	later	years.	
	
What	 mortgage	 borrowers	 needed	 was	 a	 stability	 of	 disposable	 income	 after	
mortgage	costs.	The	only	way	to	achieve	this	objective	 is	 to	set	the	standard	at	
28%	 of	 gross	 income.	 Instead	 of	 going	 for	 foreclosure	 proceedings,	 a	 National	
Mortgage	Bank	(NMB)	could	have	been	established	owned	by	the	U.S.	Treasury.	
This	NMB	could,	at	the	request	of	a	borrower,	take	over	the	mortgage	loan	from	
the	 private	 sector	 bank	 at	 a	 10%	penalty	 to	 the	 bank	 for	 error-prone	 lending.	
Once	the	transaction	completed,	the	28%	of	income	rule	would	be	applied	to	the	
mortgage.	The	mortgagee	would	stay	in	the	home,	as	owner,	so	there	would	be	
no	forced	sale.	The	mortgagee	would	pay	the	NMB	each	month	the	28%	of	gross	
income	that	includes	insurance	and	property	taxes.	
	
As	the	NMB	would	be	a	government-owned	company,	it	could	and	should	accept	
that	 the	28%	of	gross	 income	will	vary	over	 the	working	 life	of	 the	mortgagee.	
There	will	be	underpayments	and	overpayments	periods	over	a	30-year	period.	
The	great	advantage	would	have	been	that	consumption	levels	would	have	been	
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less	affected	in	the	economic	downturn	period.	However,	 in	a	more	prosperous	
period,	higher	mortgage	payment	levels	based	on	increased	income	levels	would	
be	the	logical	extension.	
	
The	 main	 attraction	 of	 the	 scheme	 is	 that	 macro-economically	 speaking,	 the	
mortgage	 borrowers,	 in	 line	 with	 their	 earnings,	 can	 maintain	 consumption	
levels.	Secondly,	 the	mortgagee	does	not	 lose	 its	savings	 in	 the	property	as	 the	
property	 ownership	 remains	 unaffected.	 The	mortgagee	 also	 does	 not	 need	 to	
look	for	rented	accommodation.	The	negative	pressure	on	house	prices	(through	
the	forced	sales	system	as	a	consequence	of	households	falling	behind	with	their	
mortgage	payments)	is	taken	away.	
	
If	such	a	system	had	been	put	in	place	in	2008,	it	would	have	avoided	the	deep	
downturn	 in	 economic	 growth.	 Consumers	would	 not	 have	 had	 to	 reallocate	 a	
larger	than	28%	share	of	their	incomes	to	mortgage	servicing.	The	government	
would	have	simultaneously	stabilized	house	prices,	as	fewer	homes	would	have	
been	 offered	 for	 sale	 at	 rock-bottom	 prices.	 All	 homeowners	 would	 have	
benefitted.	
	
In	a	recent	report	on	the	state	of	the	U.S.	housing	market,	Attom	concluded	the	
following:		
“Nationwide,	 the	 Q4	 2018	 home	 affordability	 index	 of	 91	 was	 down	 from	 an	
index	of	94	in	the	previous	quarter	and	an	index	of	106	in	Q4	2017	to	the	lowest	
level	since	Q3	2008,	when	the	index	was	87”.14	
	
Perhaps	it	might	be	just	as	helpful	to	establish	the	NMB	in	2019,	as	it	would	have	
been	in	2008.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																								
14	https://www.attomdata.com/news/market-trends/q4-2018-u-s-home-affordability-report/	
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2.	A	pension	savings	scheme	for	some	European	countries.	
	
2.1	The	links	between	the	U.S.	financial	crisis	of	2007-2008	and	the	current	
pension	crisis	in	some	countries	in	Europe.	
	
The	 U.S.	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2007-2008	 fundamentally	 changed	 the	 financial	
landscape	for	all	savings	products	in	Europe.	This	was	due	to	the	many	financial	
and	trading	links	between	Europe	and	the	U.S.	The	European	Central	Bank	(ECB)	
followed	 in	 the	 footsteps	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Bank.	 In	 March	 2003,	 it	
increased	its	refinancing	rate	from	2.5%	in	two	steps	to	4.25%	in	July	2008,	to	be	
followed	by	reducing	this	rate	in	four	steps	to	0.0%	in	March	2016.	The	ECB	also	
followed	the	U.S.	with	a	program	of	Quantitative	Easing.	Since	2015,	the	ECB	has	
invested	 €2.5	 trillion	 into	 buying	 up	 Eurozone	 government	 debt	 paper.	 This	
equaled	22.3%	of	Eurozone’s	GDP	in	2017.	
	
The	 U.S.	 government	 debt	 situation	 and	 the	 one	 from	 the	 Eurozone	 countries	
was	 fairly	equal	 in	Q4	200715	at	62.9%	versus	 the	Eurozone	 figure	of	65.6%	in	
200716.	 However,	 since	 that	 point,	 the	 U.S	 debt	 to	 GDP	 level	 has	 followed	 a	
different	 growth	 path	 from	 the	 Eurozone	 countries.	 The	U.S	 debt	 to	 GDP	 level	
increased	 from	 62.9%	 Q4	 2007	 to	 103.2%	 by	 Q2	 2019.	 The	 Eurozone	
government	debt	to	GDP	level	moved	from	65.6%	in	2007	to	a	peak	of	92.0%	in	
2014	and	then	down	to	86.1%	in	2019.	
	
Additionally,	 the	ECB	started	 its	Quantitative	Easing	exercise	 in	2015.	A	simple	
conclusion	 can	 be	 drawn	 that	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 Eurozone	 countries	 were	
reducing	their	government	debt	to	GDP	levels,	the	Eurozone	government	bonds	
available	to	the	open	markets	were	reduced	by	the	€2.5	trillion	purchases	made	
by	the	ECB.	The	ECB	purchases	of	government	bonds	had	the	effect	to	speed	up	
the	ever-declining	interest	rates	on	Eurozone	government	bonds,	particularly	in	
the	stronger	Eurozone	countries	like	Germany	and	The	Netherlands.	
	
2.2	The	character	of	pension	savings	
	
Individuals	 set	 money	 aside	 from	 their	 incomes	 during	 their	 working	 life	 in	
order	 to	ensure	 that	after	a	 retirement	date,	 they	have	a	 reasonable	 income	 to	
provide	 for	 their	 expenses.	 In	 this	 concept,	 there	 is	 no	 prescribed	 level	 of	
contribution.	 There	 is	 also	 no	 market	 mechanism	 of	 supply	 and	 demand	 and	
furthermore,	there	is	no	set	retirement	date.	However,	the	reality	in	quite	a	few	
countries	is	different.	Governments	have	drawn	up	rules	and	regulations	which	
specify	 retirement	dates,	 level	of	 contributions	and	whether	 the	pension	 funds	
are	 funded	 well	 enough	 to	 provide	 current	 and	 future	 pensioners	 with	 an	
adequate	income.	
	
																																																								
15	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/gfdegdq188S	
16	https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/9510404/2-21012019-AP-EN.pdf/97de2ad5-5b7e-
4de9-ab36-7bbf8773aad0	
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It	 is	 important	 to	 emphasize	 that	 there	 is	 one	 highly	 relevant	 element	 in	 this	
whole	 process	 that	 can	 create	 a	 gap	 between	 the	 build-up	 phase	 (the	 savers	
building	up	a	pension	pot)	 and	 the	beneficiaries	 (the	 retirees).	This	 element	 is	
the	interest	rate	received	over	government	bonds.	
	
With	 all	 this	 government	 oversight,	 the	 regulators	 have	 become	 the	 decision	
makers	on	what	 is	 acceptable	and	what	 is	not.	Decisions	about	payouts	are	no	
longer	up	to	the	fund	managers	or	to	the	collective	beneficiaries.	
	
What	regulators	seem	to	have	overlooked	is	that	quantitative	easing	has	a	cost	to	
pension	 funds	 and	other	 savers.	The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 each	purchase	of	 a	
government	bond	by	a	central	bank	does	not	cost	such	central	bank	any	money;	
the	central	bank	just	creates	the	money.	The	asset	(government	bond)	acquired	
is	not	one	based	on	savings.	What	QE	does	is	that	it	replaces	the	ownership	of	an	
asset	and	the	“costs”	attached	to	it	(the	reduction	in	yields)	is	handed	over	to	the	
savers	in	general,	and	to	pension	funds	in	particular.	Add	to	that	the	lowering	of	
interest	rates	-	especially	in	the	Eurozone	area	-	and	pension	funds	in	a	number	
of	Eurozone	countries	are	facing	a	perfect	storm.	The	storm	started	in	2008	and	
the	force	of	the	wind	has	only	got	stronger	since.	
	
As	Table	1	below	 illustrates,	 the	situation	 for	pension	 funds	 in	 the	Eurozone	 is	
dire.	 30-year	 bond	 yields	 are	 delivering	 returns	which	 are	 substantially	 below	
inflation	 levels.	The	outlook	 for	more	QE	and	 further	 lowering	of	 interest	rates	
seems	likely,	given	the	current	economic	slowdown.	
	
Table	 1	 will	 set	 out	 the	 reward	 on	 30-year	 government	 bonds	 for	 a	 selected	
group	 of	 countries	 for	 2018	 and	 the	 June	 2019	 CPI	 inflation	 levels	 for	 these	
countries.	
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Table	1	
	
30-year	 bond	 yields	 compared	 to	 CPI	 inflation	 levels	 for	 selected	
countries17	
	
Country																																		30-years	Government								CPI	Annual	Inflation	
																																																			Bond	rate	2018																					as	per	June	2019	
																																																			Annual	Yield	
	
	
	
Belgium	
	
0.720	
	
1.73	
	
France			
	
0.784	
	
1.90	
	
Germany	
	
0.397	
	
1.70	
	
Italy	
	
2.610	
	
0.90	
	
Netherlands	
	
0.577	
	
2.70	
	
Spain	
	
1.419	
	
0.90	
	
U.K.	
	
1.461	
	
1.80	
	
U.S.	
	
2.910	
	
1.80	
	
	
The	 data	 for	 Belgium,	 France,	 Germany,	 The	 Netherlands	 and	 the	 United	
Kingdom	all	show	that	the	30-year	government	bond	yields	do	not	compensate	
for	 the	 inflation	 levels	 in	 their	 respective	 countries.	 Within	 the	 Eurozone	
countries,	the	data	also	shows	that	the	southern	region	of	Spain	and	Italy	differ	
substantially	 from	 the	 northern	 region	 of	 Germany,	 France,	 Belgium	 and	 The	
Netherlands.	
	
The	OECD	 collects	 statistics	 on	 the	 funded	 pension	 savings	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	
GDP18.	For	 the	OECD	countries,	 the	countries	with	the	 largest	savings	pots	as	a	
percentage	of	the	GDP	in	2017	were	respectively:	The	Netherlands	with	184.2%,	
the	United	Kingdom	with	105.3%,	the	United	States	with	84.1%,	Denmark	with	
46.3%	 and	 Spain,	 Belgium,	 Italy,	 Germany	 and	 France	with	 respectively	 9.5%,	
7.8%,	7.6%,	6.9%	and	0.7%.	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																								
17	OECD	statistics	for	2018	government	bond	yields	and	latest	inflation	levels	
				https://data.oecd.org/price/inflation-cpi.http	
18	https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=PNNI_NEW	
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2.3	The	pension	income	gap	
	
Since	 the	 last	 financial	 crisis	 in	2008,	 the	ECB	has	 initially	 pursued	 a	policy	 of	
lowering	 interest	 rates.	 From	 March	 2015,	 it	 added	 a	 policy	 of	 buying	 up	
government	bonds	from	Eurozone	member	states	to	the	extent	of	€2.5	trillion.	
	
To	 illustrate	 the	 interest	 rate	policy	with	one	example,	 let	us	 look	at	 the	ECB’s	
refinancing	 rate	 for	 the	 Eurozone	 banking	 system.	 From	 a	 level	 of	 4.25%	 per	
annum	on	9	July	2008,	this	rate	was	dropped	to	0%	per	annum	from	March	2016	
onwards,	where	it	remains	today.	If	banks	want	to	place	excess	liquidity	with	the	
ECB,	as	of	the	16th	of	July	2019,	the	rate	for	such	activity	was	a	payment	to	the	
ECB	of	0.40%	per	annum	for	a	one-month	deposit.	
	
Pension	 funds	 around	 Europe	 have	 tried	 hard	 to	 overcome	 the	 blow	 of	 lower	
interest	 rates	 levels	 and	 the	 impact	 on	 the	 yield	 curve	 from	QE	 exercises.	 The	
lowering	of	central	bank	interest	rates	since	2008	and	the	event	of	QE	as	a	policy	
instrument	 to	 counter	 the	 2008	 financial	 crisis	 have	 led	 to	 a	 near	 permanent	
situation	 of	 very	 low	 or	 even	 negative	 interest	 rates	 in	 the	 open	 markets.	
Belgium,	Denmark,	France,	Germany,	The	Netherlands	and	the	U.K.	are	some	of	
the	countries	that	have	been	affected	by	the	pension	income	gap.	With	a	slowing	
Eurozone	 economic	 growth	 level,	 further	 cuts	 in	 interest	 rates	 and	 further	
Quantitative	Easing	measures	cannot	be	excluded.	
	
This	 is	 highlighted	 by	 a	 few	 of	 the	 recent	 newspaper	 headlines:	 “UK	 ‘scarily’	
exposed	 to	 next	 major	 downturn”19 .	 “Only	 one	 in	 25	 see	 fixed	 rate	 ISA’s	
(Individual	Savings	Accounts)	nest	eggs	beat	inflation”.20	
	
In	an	article	in	Investments	and	Pensions	Europe21	,	18th	July	2019,	it	stipulated	
that	 “the	 two	 largest	 pension	 funds	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 ABP	 and	 PFZW,	 face	
imminent	benefit	cuts	for	their	6	million	members	next	year,	despite	their	solid	
returns	on	investments	in	the	second	quarter	of	2019.	Since	March,	interest	rates		
have	dropped	30bps	to	0.88%	causing	funding	levels	at	Dutch	pension	funds	to	
fall	by	several	percentage	points.”	
	
The	long	term	effects	on	pension	savings	as	a	consequence	of	the	2008	financial	
crisis	and	the	actions	taken	by	the	ECB,	both	through	lowering	the	base	rate	to	
zero	and	below	and	through	the	quantitative	easing	exercise	to	the	extent	of	€2.5	
trillion,	have	led	to	a	level	of	compensation	on	pension	savings	that	is,	for	many	
countries,	far	below	their	respective	CPI	inflation	rates.	
	
The	 forecasts	 for	 economic	 growth	 for	 the	 Eurozone	 countries	 for	 2020	 have	
very	recently	been	lowered	to	1.6%	according	to	Euronews22.		
	
																																																								
19	https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2019/07/15/uk-scarily-exposed-next-major-downturn-
economists-warn/	
20	https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7271047/Just-one-25-fixed-rate-ISAs-return-beats-current-
two-percent-inflation-rate.html	
21		www.ipe.com/countries/netherlands/biggest-dutch-pension-funds-face-imminent-benefit-cuts-
following-new-rules/	
22	https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/10/eu-lowers-eurozone-2020-growth-forecast	
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The	pension	savers	 in	many	countries,	 including	 the	group	of	 retirees,	have	no	
opportunity	other	than	to	save	even	more	in	current	periods,	or	accept	a	benefit	
cut.	The	threat	of	another	recession	 in	the	near	 future	 leads	to	an	even	greater	
urgency	to	seek	a	solution	to	this	problem.	
	
	
2.4	Structural	changes	in	pension	provision	
	
A	number	of	structural	changes	have	taken	place	since	2008.		
	
In	2011,	an	article	from	Pinsent	Masons,	a	U.K.	law	firm,	stated:	
	
“Employers	with	defined	benefit	pension	schemes,	such	as	final	salary	schemes,	
are	 increasingly	 looking	 for	 ways	 to	 reduce	 their	 exposure	 to	 heavy	 financial	
liability.	 Many	 such	 schemes	 are	 already	 closed	 to	 new	 joiners,	 but	more	 and	
more	companies	are	looking	at	closing	schemes	to	existing	members	so	that	no 
more	 benefits	 can	 be	 earned	 under	 the	 scheme.	 This	 is	 also	 known	 as	 ceasing	
future	accrual”.23 
	
Since	2011,	many	company-defined	benefits	schemes	have	been	closed,	not	only	
for	 new	 employees,	 but	 also	 for	 existing	 ones	 due	 to	 the	 explosive	 increase	 in	
costs	 attached	 to	 such	 schemes.	 This	 applied	 not	 only	 to	 the	U.K.,	 but	 also	 for	
many	multinationals	and	other	large	and	smaller	companies	in	Europe.		
	
In	an	FT	article	about	 the	U.K	pension	crisis,	written	by	Alex	Cunningham24	on	
November	28,	2017,	he	wrote:	
	
“It	is	becoming	increasingly	clear	that	the	quality	of	retirement	many	pensioners	
are	 enjoying	 now	 will	 not	 be	 available	 to	 current	 and	 future	 generations	 of	
workers.	 There	 are	 only	 500,000	 private	 sector	 employees	 in	 defined	 benefit	
pension	 schemes,	which	are	open	 to	new	members,	 according	 to	 the	Office	 for	
National	Statistics.	This	shows	how	quickly	“final	salary”	pensions	have	declined	
—	in	2000,	there	were	more	than	6m.	Today,	the	vast	majority	of	private	sector	
employees	are	in	defined	contribution	schemes.	Many	of	these	are	at	the	lowest	
level	 required	 for	 auto-enrolment	 with	 employees	 and	 employers	 currently	
paying	 the	minimum	1	 per	 cent	 contribution,	 albeit	 soon	 to	 be	 increased.	 The	
move	from	defined	benefit	to	individual	defined	contribution	pensions	has	been	
a	 move	 from	 cost	 efficiency	 to	 inefficiency,	 from	 security	 to	 insecurity.	
Employers	have	been	able	to	push	the	investment	risk	on	to	their	employees.”	
	
The	same	transfer	of	risks	did	not	only	happen	in	the	U.K.,	but	also	in	many	of	the	
Eurozone	countries.		
	
Therefore	a	valid	question	is:	is	it	fair	that	individual	households	should	become	
the	victims	 (losers)	due	 to	 government	 and	 central	 bank	policies?	These	 latter	
policies	were	devised	to	counteract	the	recessionary	effects	of	the	2008	financial	
crisis,	but	they	have	simultaneously	created	many	losers	who	saw	their	savings	
																																																								
23	https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/guides/closing-defined-benefit-pension-schemes	
24	https://www.ft.com/content/5a7f8378-d354-11e7-a303-9060cb1e5f44	
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whittled	away	by	the	low	returns	on	government	bonds;	below	the	CPI	inflation	
rate.	What	happened	to	promises	made	by	companies	and	governments?	
	
	
	
	
3.	The	interaction	of	a	government	and	its	central	bank	
	
3.1	The	roles	of	a	government	acting	as	a	borrower	
	
The	standard	role	of	governments	is	to	 issue	bonds	for	funding	its	deficits.	The	
need	for	such	issuance	is	linked	to	the	economic	policies	chosen	and	the	volume	
of	tax	receipts	during	a	specific	period.	For	instance,	in	the	aftermath	of	the	U.S.	
financial	crisis,	the	total	Federal	Government	debt	increased	from	U.S.	$	10.024	
trillion	 in	 2008	 to	 $21.606	 trillion	 by	 2018.	 Over	 the	 same	 period	 the	 U.S.	
population	increased	from	304.09	million	in	2008	to	327.17	million	by	2018,	an	
increase	of	7.59%.	Government	debt	per	capita	increased	from	$32,964	in	2008	
to	$66,039	in	2018;	a	doubling	of	per	capita	debt	in	just	10	years!	
	
For	other	countries,	like	in	the	Netherlands,	the	debt	to	GDP	ratio	moved	up	from	
54.7%	in	2008	to	its	peak	of	67.9%	in	2014	and	then	lowered	back	to	52.4%	in	
2018.	The	Netherlands	government	debt	level	was	€	401.9	billion	at	the	end	of	
2018.	On	 a	 population	 of	 17.1	million,	 this	 translates	 into	 a	 debt	 per	 capita	 of	
€23,500.	
	
In	 the	Netherlands,	as	was	the	case	 in	some	other	Eurozone	countries,	pension	
promises	 were	 made	 for	 inflation	 proof	 pensions.	 	 However,	 the	 promised	
pension	payments	(promised	especially	but	not	exclusively	to	civil	servants)	did	
not	and	have	not	turned	out	to	be	inflation-proof	after	all.	Whatever	the	excuses	
governments	have	come	up	with,	none	seems	to	have	put	even	partial	blame	on	
the	ECB	for	its	QE	program	and	its	lowering	of	interest	rates	far	below	inflation	
levels.	
	
Dutch	 pension	 savers,	 including	 civil	 servants,	 have	 accumulated	 a	 pension	
reserve	over	the	years	of	184.2%	of	Dutch	GDP	in	2017,	according	to	the	latest	
data.	 This	 was	 equivalent	 to	 €1.267	 trillion	 in	 savings.	 With	 an	 average	 life	
expectancy	of	81.4	years	in	the	Netherlands,	a	very	rough	estimate	based	on	an	
average	 starting	 date	 of	 pension	 saving	 at	 the	 age	 of	 25	 years	 is	 that	 the	
accumulated	pension	savings	of	€	1.267	trillion	can	be	divided	over	56.4	years.	
This	results	in	an	annual	pension	savings	amount	of	roughly	€	22.5	billion.	
	
3.2	The	role	of	a	government	acting	as	a	regulator	of	pensions	
	
In	a	number	of	countries	the	supervision	role	over	pension	funds	 is	sometimes	
delegated	 to	 a	 central	 bank,	 like	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 or	 to	 a	 special	 pension	
regulator	 as	 in	 the	 U.K.	 In	 the	 U.K.	 the	 Pensions	 Regulator	 (TPR)	 is	 the	 UK	
regulator	 of	 work-based	 pension	 schemes.	 It	 works	 with	 trustees,	 employers,	
pension	specialists	and	business	advisers,	giving	guidance	on	what	is	expected	of	
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them.	 TPR	is	 an	 executive	 non-departmental	 public	 body,	 sponsored	 by	
the	Department	for	Work	and	Pensions.	
The	rule	making	is	usually	entrusted	to	Parliaments	and	executed	by	the	pension	
regulators.	
3.3	 The	 key	 role	 of	 macro-economic	 management	 in	 some	 Eurozone	
countries.	
	
The	 European	 Central	 Bank	 is	 the	 key	 player	 in	 setting	 interest	 rates	 for	 the	
Eurozone	 countries.	 It	 also	 takes	 decisions	 on	 QE	 exercises.	 The	 Board	 taking	
such	 decisions	 consists	 of	 the	 Presidents	 of	 the	 National	 Central	 Banks	 of	 the	
Eurozone.	
	
If,	for	a	future	pension	benefit,	a	saver	puts	money	aside	in	the	current	period,	he	
foregoes	consumption	in	the	current	period.	If	the	ECB	buys	government	bonds	
from	Eurozone	countries,	it	does	not	forego	current	consumption;	it	just	creates	
the	money	 to	 pay	 for	 such	 bonds.	 The	 ECB	 competes	 with	 individual	 pension	
savers,	 but	not	on	equal	 terms.	 It	 costs	 the	ECB	nothing	 to	purchase	Eurozone	
government	 bonds.	 However,	 such	 competition	 for	 financial	 assets	 leaves	
pension	 savers	 in	 a	 disadvantageous	 position.	 The	 latter	 lose	 out	 in	 terms	 of	
compensation	levels	over	such	bonds.	When	the	ECB,	 in	 its	recent	QE	program,	
injected	€2.5	trillion	into	the	Eurozone	government	bond	markets,	inevitably	the	
demand	 for	existing	bonds	went	up	and	 the	yields	 came	down.	The	 losers:	 the	
collective	of	individual	pension	savers	(among	others).		
	
Take	Italy	for	example.	In	2009,	Italy’s	government	debt	as	compared	to	its	GDP	
was	 112.5%	 of	 its	 GDP.	 By	 2018	 its	 government	 debt	 was	 132.2%	 of	 GDP.	 In	
2009	 Italy	 paid	 a	 yield	 to	 its	 10-year	 government	 bondholders	 of	 4.36%	 per	
annum.	The	debt	went	up	by	17.5%	over	these	years	and	the	reward	for	the	10-
year	bondholders	went	down	to	1.55%	by	August	1	2019.	May	this	perhaps	have	
something	to	do	with	the	ECB’s	QE	program?	What	is	clear	is	that	there	has	been	
a	negative	correlation	between	the	level	of	government	debt	and	its	pricing.	Such	
pricing	is	highly	detrimental	to	those	who	try	to	save	for	a	pension.	
	
A	main	 objective	 of	 the	 ECB	 is	 to	maintain	 an	 inflation	 level	 at	 2%	 or	 slightly	
below	that	level	per	annum.	For	the	main	Southern	European	countries	like	Italy	
and	 Spain	 the	 inflation	 target	 has	 not	 achieved	 its	 objective.	 For	 Belgium,	
Germany	and	France	the	result	has	been	close.	In	the	Netherlands	the	target	was	
exceeded.	
	
Is	it	not	extraordinary	that	among	the	Eurozone	countries	the	countries	with	the	
relatively	 highest	 CPI	 inflation	 levels	 (Belgium,	 France	 Germany	 and	 the	
Netherlands)	also	have	the	lowest	yields	on	government	bonds?	These	levels	are	
well	below	the	CPI	 inflation	 levels.	Meanwhile	 in	Spain	and	Italy,	 the	reverse	 is	
true:	long	term	government	yields	are	well	above	inflation	levels.	
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Somehow	 one	 has	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 treatment	 for	 savers	 is	 different	 for	
northern	 European	 countries	 than	 those	 living	 in	 their	 southern	 neighboring	
countries.		
	
3.4	The	key	question	
	
The	 conclusion	drawn	 from	 the	 above	was	 that	 countries	within	 the	Eurozone	
differ	 in	 the	 state	 of	 their	 pension	 savings,	 the	 state	 of	 their	 government	 debt	
levels,	and	the	state	of	their	CPI	inflation	levels.	
	
Therefore,	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 deterioration	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 inflation-proof	
pensions	cannot	be	solved	by	changes	in	interest	rates	and	more	QE,	but	should	
be	found	on	a	country-by-country	basis.	
	
Now,	 a	 possible	 solution	 will	 be	 illustrated	 for	 the	 country	 with	 the	 highest	
pension	savings	ratio	as	compared	to	GDP:	the	Netherlands.	
	
In	order	to	come	up	with	a	possible	solution,	one	has	to	accept	the	premise	that	
the	principal	cause	of	the	 long-term	decline	 in	 interest	rates	 in	Europe	was	the	
2008	financial	crisis.	This	crisis	was	caused	by	the	U.S.	banking	system,	including	
European	banks	operating	in	the	U.S.,	lending	excessively	to	U.S.	homeowners.		
	
The	 U.S.	 government	 never	 seriously	 explored	 the	 possibility	 of	 helping	 the	
mortgagees.	The	possibility	of	a	temporary	transfer	of	ownership	of	a	property	
to	 a	 government	 agency	 against	 a	 regular	 payment	 of	 28%	of	 the	mortgagee’s	
income	 was	 never	 considered.	 The	 result:	 excessive	 house	 price	 drops,	 large	
numbers	 of	 repossessions,	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 new	 construction	 industry	 and	
many	households	declared	bankrupt.	 Instead	of	an	income-based	approach,	the	
U.S.	government	opted	for	lowering	the	interest	rates	and	for	Quantitative	Easing	
to	 the	 extent	 of	 $3.5	 trillion	 as	 well	 as	 a	 substantial	 increase	 in	 government	
deficits	as	mentioned	in	the	above.		
	
As	the	financial	obligations	of	U.S.	homeowners	were	internationalized	through	
the	 syndication	 of	 prime	 and	 subprime	 bonds,	 European	 investors	 and	 banks	
were	also	affected	by	the	developments	in	the	U.S.	Some	European	banks	had	to	
be	rescued.	
	
In	hindsight,	 it	would	have	been	quicker	and	much	cheaper	in	macro-economic	
terms	 if	 the	 U.S.	 government	 had	 opted	 for	 an	 income-based	 approach	 for	
struggling	homeowners,	as	explored	above.	Economic	growth	levels	would	have	
been	less	affected.	The	need	for	QE	would	have	been	reduced,	if	not	made	totally	
superfluous.	 	 The	 key	 to	 continued	 economic	 growth	 would	 have	 been	 the	
capacity	 by	 the	 mortgagees	 to	 continue	 spending	 rather	 than	 allocating	 very	
large	shares	of	their	reduced	incomes	to	debt	servicing.	
	
Of	course,	economies	are	interlinked	through	trade	and	financial	arrangements.	
The	Eurozone	countries	also	saw	their	economic	growth	affected	after	the	2008	
U.S.	financial	crisis.		
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There	 are	 great	 parallels	 between	 the	pension	 savers	 in	 the	Eurozone	 and	 the	
American	mortgagees.	Both	try	to	save	for	either	a	home	or	a	future	income:	the	
first	group	by	borrowing,	and	subsequently	 saving	up,	 the	value	of	a	mortgage	
out	of	income;	and	the	latter	to	set	aside	current	income	for	future	use.	The	link	
is	 that	both	actions	are	 income	 led.	The	risk	 for	 the	mortgagee	 is	 that	 incomes	
could	 drop	 and	 that	 house	 prices	 could	 drop	 below	 the	 outstanding	mortgage	
amount;	 the	 risk	 for	 the	 pension	 saver	 is	 that	 the	 rewards	 received	 are	
inadequate	to	guarantee	an	inflation-proof	income	in	later	years.	
	
	
4.	A	possible	alternative	solution	for	the	Netherlands	pension	funds	crisis	
	
If	mortgage	borrowers	in	the	U.S.	could	have	been	supported	by	allowing	them	to	
pay	 a	 fixed	 percentage	 of	 their	 variable	 incomes	 to	 a	National	Mortgage	Bank,	
then	 pension	 savers	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 could	 be	 saved	 through	 a	 similar	
arrangement	through	the	establishment	of	a	National	Pension	Bank	(NPB).	
	
The	main	objective	of	 an	NPB	would	be	 to	 increase	 the	 reward	of	 government	
bonds	 to	CPI,	 or	CPI	plus	0.25%	 levels.	 In	 the	Dutch	 situation,	 one	has	 to	note	
that	 the	 collective	pension	 savings	 in	 the	Netherlands	have	 reached	184.1%	of	
Dutch	GDP	 in	2017	while	government	debt	 to	GDP	stood	at	58.7%	in	 the	same	
year.	Such	a	situation	already	requires	the	extensive	purchase	of	 foreign	bonds	
by	Dutch	pension	fund	managers.	
	
The	 main	 objective	 of	 a	 NPB	 is	 not	 one	 of	 dictating	 which	 other	 (foreign)	
government	 bonds	 would	 be	 acceptable.	 That	 would	 be	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Dutch	
Central	Bank	as	a	pension	funds	regulator.	
	
The	current	threat	in	the	Netherlands	is	that	the	two	largest	pension	funds	plus	
49	 smaller	 ones	 are	 actively	 considering	 -	 or	 are	 being	 forced	 by	 government	
rules	 -	 to	cut	pension	payouts	next	year.	Such	action	will	affect	 some	6	million	
individuals	out	of	a	population	of	just	over	17	million.	
	
In	order	to	stabilize	the	performance	of	pension	funds	in	the	Netherlands,	a	rule	
of	 thumb	 could	 point	 to	 a	 portfolio	 of	 around	 50%	of	 government	 bonds.	 The	
NPB	 could	 receive	 funds	 from	 the	 Finance	 Ministry.	 These	 funds	 should	 be	
sufficient	 to	 cover	 the	 interest	 gap	 between	 CPI	 levels	 and	 actual	 interest	 due	
over	the	incremental	purchase	of	new	government	bonds	in	a	particular	year.	If	
the	NPB	guarantees	that	in	future	years	this	same	process	will	be	maintained,	a	
substantial	element	of	pension	funds’	performances	would	be	taken	care	of.	
	
How	 should	 the	 payments	 between	 the	 Finance	 Ministry	 and	 the	 NPB	 be	
recorded?	Such	payments	should	be	seen	as	advances	to	pension	savers,	who	in	
due	 course	 will	 have	 to	 pay	 tax	 over	 their	 incomes.	 It	 should	 therefore	 be	
recorded	as	a	different	category	of	government	debt;	different	in	the	sense	that	
such	advances	are	not	actual	government	expenditure,	but	a	type	of	loan	and	gift	
that	 will	 be	 partially	 repaid	 through	 higher	 future	 spending	 levels	 by	 the	
pensioners,	and	future	tax	receipts	collected	out	of	income	taxes.	
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In	this	context,	one	has	also	to	consider	the	detrimental	effects	that	cutbacks	on	
pension	 pay-outs	 will	 have	 on	 economic	 growth	 levels	 if	 benefit	 cuts	 are	
executed.	
	
On	 balance,	 one	might	 come	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 at	 a	 time	 of	 expected	 slow	
economic	growth,	the	timing	of	getting	an	NPB	up	and	running	is	as	opportune	
to-day	as	it	will	ever	be.	
	
Drs	Kees	De	Koning	
Chorleywood	U.K.	
7th	September	2019	
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